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In July 1997, Etim U. Aka, a 55-year-old man who had
worked as an orderly for Washington Hospital for twenty years,
developed heart disease and underwent a bypass surgery.1 As
an employee of Washington Hospital, Aka was a member of the
Service Employees International Union Local 722 and his em-
ployment was governed by a collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the union and his employer.2 Aka's position as orderly
was physically strenuous and his doctor advised that he would
no longer be able to continue in the position Aka notified his
employer of his disability, and he applied for several vacant, less
strenuous positions advertised by the hospital.4 Despite his appli-
cation, the hospital did not hire Aka for any of the positions,5 ar-
guing that such a reassignment would violate the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement between it and the union.
6
* J.D. Candidate 1999, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1993,
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4. See id. Most of these positions were equivalent to Aka's former job in
terms of pay. See id.
5. See id For some of the positions, the employer found Aka to be less
qualified than other applicants who had less seniority than Aka. Because of
this fact, the employer gave the positions to applicants with less seniority
than Aka. Under the collective bargaining agreement, the employer was not
required to give a position to an applicant with less qualifications, regardless
of the seniority of the less qualified worker. See id. at 879.
6. See id. at 892.
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Aka filed suit against Washington Hospital claiming that he
was discriminated against under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).7 Specifically, he charged that the ADA required the
hospital to provide "reasonable accommodations" for his disabil-
ity including "reassignment to a vacant position."8 The district
court rejected Aka's claim and granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of Washington Hospital.9 The court held the "reassignment to
a vacant non-strenuous position would have violated the collec-
tive bargaining agreement" 0 by infringing on the seniority rights
of other workers who requested a reassignment to the same po-
sition." The court concluded that the ADA did not require vio-
lation of collectively bargained seniority rights as a reasonable
accommodation. 2 The D.C. Circuit Court reversed, holding that
Aka had raised a legitimate claim under the ADA and that the
court must order him reassigned if it determined the transfer to be
a reasonable accommodation. 3 In so holding, the court concluded
that a reassignment precluded by the terms of a collectively bar-
gained seniority system could be a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA. 14
The Aka court was the first circuit court to adopt this inter-
pretation of the ADA. Prior to Aka, a majority of courts, most
notably the Seventh Circuit in Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Inc.,
granted summary judgment against disabled workers seeking
reassignment in a unionized workplace. These courts held that
7. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)). Aka also al-
leged that the hospital discriminated on the basis of
national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964[,] ... on the basis of his age in violation of the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967[,] .... and a failure to reinstate him
after his medial leave in violation of the District of Columbia Family
and Medical Leave Act.
Aka, 116 F.3d at 879.
8. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 890-91; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994).
9. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 877.
10. Id. at 892.
11 See id.
12. See id. at 897.
13. See id. Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit granted Washington Hospital's
petition for rehearing en banc. The court ordered the current decision vacated
and en banc review is pending. Aka v. Washington Hosp. Center, 124 F.3d
1302 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
14. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 897.
15. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996). A
number of circuit courts have supported this decision. See infra note 73
(listing courts that concurred with Eckles).
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a reassignment request that violated collectively bargained sen-
iority rights was not a reasonable accommodation under the
ADA as a matter of law.6 Courts based this conclusion not on a
finding that a reassignment in this context would constitute an
undue hardship on the employer, but rather on a determination
that the ADA never required an accommodation that would vio-
late the seniority rights of other workers. 7 Thus, under the ma-
jority approach, an employee will never, as a matter of law, be
entitled to a reassignment that contradicts collectively bargained
seniority rights.
This Note considers whether Aka was correct in challenging
the majority trend and adopting the view that the ADA requires
the transfer of disabled workers notwithstanding violation of
collectively bargained seniority rights. Part I provides a brief his-
tory of the ADA and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Part II describes the judicial approaches to the conflict between
seniority rights and statutory rights under both the ADA and
Title VII. Part IlI argues that the Aka court's holding that reas-
signment may be a viable accommodation, even if it contradicts
collectively bargained seniority rights, is sound as a matter of
law and policy. This Note concludes that unionized workplaces
and non-union workplaces should be treated similarly and that
the fact-specific "reasonable accommodation" standard should be
applied to evaluate all reassignment requests under the ADA,
notwithstanding a conflicting seniority system.
I. THE ADA AND THE NLRA: WORKPLACE PROTECTIONS
FOR EMPLOYEES
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) with the intention
of increasing protections for employees.18 While the ADA is de-
signed to protect individual disabled workers, a subset of em-
ployees who had been subject to extreme disadvantages in the
workplace,19 the NLRA provides a mechanism for all employees
to increase their power through collective action.20
16. See infra note 73 (describing the majority's holding).
17. See infra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (describing the majority's
analysis).
18. See infra notes 21-25, 46-49 and accompanying text (describing Con-
gress's intention in enacting the NURA and the ADA).
19. See infra Part I-41 (describing the ADA).
20. See infra notes Part 1.B.1 (describing the NLRA).
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A. THE AMERICANS wITH DIsABILITIEs ACT
1. History of the ADA
On July 26, 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act (ADA)" to address the problem of discrimination
against disabled persons in a variety of areas.' Congress in-
tended the ADA to address the "pervasive social problem" of
large numbers of disabled persons who were excluded from full
participation in society because of their disability.' In the area
of employment, for example, studies showed that many disabled
persons wanted jobs but were unable to find them despite their
qualifications. Consequently, Congress enacted Title I of the
21. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified primarily at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994)).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). The ADA contains four Titles. Title I
protects individuals from discrimination in the workforce. See id. §§ 12111-
12117. Title H focuses on discrimination in the provision of public services.
See id. §§ 12131-12165. Title M covers stores, restaurants, theaters, and
other services operated by private entities. See id. §§ 12166-12200. Title IV
includes miscellaneous provisions. See id. §§ 12201-12213.
Many commentators believed that the provisions of the ADA were too
vague and would result in confusion and excessive lawsuits. See, e.g., Thomas
H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers
and Dream for Lawyers?, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 229, 239-52 (1990) (arguing
that many of the provisions of the ADA were so vague that they would result
in lawsuits to be determined on a case-by-case basis).
23. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2)-(9). Passage of the ADA was not Con-
gress's first attempt to protect disabled persons in the workplace. In 1973
Congress had passed the Rehabilitation Act, which provided protection for
disabled employees. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
Its scope, however, was limited to federal employers and employers who con-
tracted with the federal government, and its requirements were neither as
detailed nor as extensive as those of the ADA. See id.
Despite the differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA,
many courts have considered case precedent from the Rehabilitation Act a
persuasive authority in interpreting the ADA. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047-49 (7th Cir. 1996). But see Gile v. United Airlines,
Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996) (arguing that courts have been mistaken
in relying on Rehabilitation Act precedent in interpreting the reassignment
provision of the ADA and concluding that the majority of courts find the Re-
habilitation Act cases irrelevant in determining a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA).
24. The Senate Report contained the results of a Lou Harris poll that
conveyed the plight of many disabled Americans in regards to employment
status. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 9 (1989). The poll indicated that "[s]ixty-
six percent of working-age disabled persons, who are not working, say that
they would like to have a job" and that "[elighty-two percent of people with
disabilities said they would give up their government benefits in favor of a
full-time job." Id.
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ADA to increase the employment of qualified disabled persons by
protecting them against discrimination in the workplace and in
the application process.O
2. Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship
Title I of the ADA requires "covered entit[ies]," 6 including
employers and labor unions27 not only to refrain from inten-
tional discrimination against the disabled but also to provide
disabled employees with "reasonable accommodation[s] "2 to en-
able them to enjoy equal employment opportunities.2 The re-
quirement that employers take affirmative steps to accommodate
a disabled worker" sets the ADA apart from most other civil
rights statutes, which only require an employer to treat employees
25. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. At the passage of the ADA, Congress
recognized the need for more detailed regulations in order to guide its inter-
pretation. For this reason, it delayed the ADA's implementation and instructed
the EEOC to promulgate regulations. See 104 Stat. 336 § 106 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12116) (instructing the EEOC to issue regulations within one year);
id. § 108 (stating that the effective date of the ADA is 24 months after the en-
actment). The EEOC regulations have not clarified all of the issues that arise
under the ADA.
26. 42 U.S.C § 12112(2). The statute defines a covered entity as: "an em-
ployer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee." Id § 12111(2). It provides that no "covered entity shall discrimi-
nate against a qualified individual with a disability." Id. § 12112(a).
27. In addition to inclusion in the definition of a covered entity, labor un-
ions are included in the Act in another section. The Act defines discrimina-
tion as including
participa[tion] in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship
that has the effect of subjecting a covered entity's qualified applicant
or employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited by this
subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship with an em-
ployment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing
fringe benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organiza-
tion providing training and apprenticeship programs).
Id. § 12112(b)(2).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (describing the reasonable accommodation
standard); id. § 12111(10) (describing the factors involved in an undue hard-
ship analysis). "Discrimination" includes: "not making reasonable accommo-
dations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such cov-
ered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operations of the business of such covered entity." Id. §
12112(5)(A)
29. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.2(o)(iii) (1996).
30. See 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o), at 355 (1997) (defining reasonable ac-
commodation as a "change in the work environment or in the way things are




equally.3' The ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement re-
flects Congress's recognition that the creation of equal employment
opportunities for disabled workers requires, in some cases, the
removal of non-essential barriers that previously have prevented
otherwise qualified workers from achieving full employment.32
Rather than provide a highly specific definition of a reason-
able accommodation, the ADA includes examples of employer
actions, which may be reasonable in certain circumstances, in-
cluding job restructuring, reassignment to a vacant position,33
the provision of qualified readers, and other similar accommoda-
tions.34 In a particular case, however, the determination of what
accommodations should be provided by an employer is evaluated
in light of the particular needs of the individual and the impact of
the accommodation on the employer's resources and operations.35
The ADA limits reasonable accommodations to those which
do not impose an "undue hardship" on the employer.36 An
"undue hardship" is an "action requiring significant difficulty or
expense" on the part of the employer.3 7 The Act lists factors to be
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-2(a)(1) (1994) (defining as unlawful employment
practices treating workers differently because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
32. See 29 C.F.R. app. 1630, at 348 (1997) ("When an individual's disabil-
ity creates a barrier to employment opportunities, the ADA requires employers
to consider whether reasonable accommodation could remove the barrier.").
33. The legislative history also reflects Congress's intent to require reas-
signment to a vacant position:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a va-
cant position. If an employee, because of a disability, can no longer
perform the essential functions of the job that she or he has held, a
transfer to another vacant job for which the person is qualified may
prevent the employee from being out of work and employer from los-
ing a valuable worker.
H.R. REP 101-485(1), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.-AN. 303, 345.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Reasonable accommodations may include, "job
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate ad-
justment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies,
[and] the provision of qualified readers or interpreters and other similar ac-
commodations for individuals with disabilities." Id.
35. See id. §§ 12111(9)-(10).
36. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (stating that reasonable accommodations are
required unless they would impose an undue hardship on the employer).
37. See id. § 12111(10) ("[Tlhe term 'undue hardship' means an action re-
quiring significant difficulty and expense, when considered in light of the fac-
tors set forth in [the Act]."); see also Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d
Cir. 1997) (holding that an employer is required to provide a reassignment
unless it is an undue hardship). In evaluating an undue hardship, there are
some factors which are not listed in the Act but which may be encompassed by
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considered in determining whether a proposed accommodation
constitutes an undue hardship, including the nature and cost of
the accommodation, the financial resources of the employer, the
size of the employer, the type of operation, and the impact of the
accommodation on the operation of the facility 8 Thus, the de-
termination of whether a proposed accommodation constitutes
an undue hardship requires a fact-specific analysis.
3. Reassignment as a Reasonable Accommodation
Although the ADA and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) regulations39 both list reassignment as a
the broad language. One of these factors is the effect on the co-workers of the
disabled employee who would receive the accommodation. See Lisa E. Key,
Co-Worker Morale, Confidentiality and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 46
DEPAUL L. REv. 1003, 1035-1041 (1997) (arguing that co-worker moral should
be considered as a factor in an undue hardship analysis in certain circum-
stances).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B). The statute lists the following factors to be
considered in an undue hardship analysis:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chap-
ter; (ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number
of persons employed at such facility; the effect on expenses and re-
sources, or impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the opera-
tion of the facility; (iii) the overall financial resources of the covered
entity; the overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect
to the number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities; and (iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered
entity, including the composition, structure, and functions of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administra-
tive, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the
covered entity.
Id-
39. The EEOC has expressed a clear intent that in certain cases reas-
signment to a vacant position is a required accommodation under the ADA.
The EEOC guidelines stipulate that:
Reassignment to a vacant position is also listed as a reasonable ac-
commodation. In general, reassignment should be considered only
when accommodation within the individuals current position would
pose an undue hardship.... Employers should reassign the individ-
ual to an equivalent position, in terms of pay, status, etc., if the indi-
vidual is qualified and if the position is vacant within a reasonable
amount of time.
29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o), at 356 (1997).
The EEOC also states that reassignment should occur regardless of any
conflicting collective bargaining agreement:
The terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant in
determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship.
For example: A worker who has a deteriorated disc condition and
cannot perform the heavy labor functions of a machinist job, requests
13971998]
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possible reasonable accommodation, Congress, courts and the
EEOC have imposed limits on the application of the reassignment
provision in a variety of ways. First, an employer is not required
to reassign a disabled employee when there is no vacant position
available.4 Therefore, employers are not required to create a
new position or to displace an employee from a position in order
to accommodate a disabled worker Second, employers are not
required to promote a disabled worker in order to reassign.4 2 Fi-
nally, employers must attempt to accommodate an employee
within the employee's current position before considering reas-
signment. 3 Subject to the above limitations and the employer's
undue hardship defense, employers must reassign a disabled
worker to a vacant position in order to comply with the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement.45 Neither the statute nor
the regulations exempt unionized workplaces from these general
standards.
B. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
1. Protections for Collective Action
Enacted in 1935, the NLRA establishes obligations for both
unions and employers in order to protect the rights of employees
reassignment to a vacant clerk's job as a reasonable accommodation.
If the collective bargaining agreement has specific seniority lists and
requirements governing each craft, it might be an undue hardship to
reassign this person if others had seniority for the job.
However, since both the employer and the union are covered by
the ADA's requirements, including the duty to provide reasonable ac-
commodation, the employer should consult with the union and try to
work out an acceptable accommodation.
EEOC, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS
OF THE AmERICANs WITH DISABILITES ACT §3.9, at 111-16 (1992).
40. See 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o), at 356 (1997); Gile v. United Airlines
Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir. 1996).
41. See 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o), at 856 (1997); Gile, 95 F.3d at 499.
42. See 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o), at 356 (1997); Gile, 95 F.3d at 499.
43. See 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.2(o), at 356 (1997).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994).
45. See Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92, 100-01 (2d Cir. 1997)(stating that a reassignment must be granted unless it was determined to be
an undue hardship on the employer); Gile, 95 F.3d at 498-99 (holding that
subject to limitations the ADA requires reassignment as a reasonable accom-
modation); Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831-32 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
if a reassignment is determined to be a reasonable accommodation, then it is
required under the ADA).
46. See RICHARD N. BLOCKET AL., LABOR LAW, INDUSTRAL RELATIONS AND
EMPLOYEE CHOICE 11 (1996). The NLRB has been amended on numerous occa-
1398 [Vol. 82:1391
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to take collective action to improve the terms and conditions of
their employment 7 The NLRA creates a structure for employ-
ees to elect a labor union to represent their interests in collective
bargaining with an employer." Once employees select a union to
represent them, the NLRA requires the union and employer to
bargain "in good faith" regarding the "terms and conditions of
employment."49
Although the NLRA requires a representative union and an
employer to engage in collective bargaining, it does not require
that a collective bargaining agreement contain any particular
provisions or protections for employees. 0 Instead, the NLRA en-
forces a process designed to move both parties toward an agree-
ment. For example, the NLRA establishes certain subjects as
mandatory subjects of bargaining and requires that the parties
bargain on the mandatory topic at the request of either party.5 '
The NLRA does not require the subject to ultimately be included
in the agreement, however; it merely enforces bargaining if one
party requests it.52 Thus, the content of any collective bargain-
ing agreement is determined solely by the desires of each party
and reflects a compromise of each parties' interests.53 Most
agreements contain some basic terms such as wages, hours,
health benefits, and procedures for hiring and allocating vacant
positions.5 4
sions after its enactment, most notably in 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), 1959 (Landrum-
Griffin Act), and in 1974 (Health Care Amendments). See id. at 14-15.
47. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994) (describing the purpose of the Act, the
obligation the employer to recognize an employee elected union, the obligation
of the union of fair representation, and the obligation of both the union and
employer to bargain in good faith in addition to other obligations).
48. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 337-582 (Patrick Hardin ed., 3d ed.
1992) (describing the structure established to allow employees to elect a union
under "laboratory conditions").
49. Id. at 593-94.
50. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994) (describing the obligation of the parties
to bargain); How ARBITRATION WORKS 667-68 (Frank Elkouri & Edna Asper
Elkouri eds., 5th ed. 1997).
51. See HOW ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 50, at 667.
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (describing the obligation of the parties to bar-
gain but stating that the Act does not require an agreement or any particular
provision).
53. See id.
54. See BNA, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 28, 42, 75-76, 98
(10th ed. 1983).
In the case of a conflict between the employer and union regarding the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, one issue that arises is whether
the arbitrator should consider outside law in interpreting a collective bargain-
ing agreement. See Robert Perkovich, Does Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
1998] 1399
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2. SENIORITY RIGHTS UNDER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS
Seniority systems are included in a majority of collective
bargaining agreements." Parties to collective bargaining often
choose to include seniority systems in their agreements because
such systems are a means of allocating scarce benefits among
employees.56 Under a typical agreement, employees accrue sen-
iority status based on their length of service. 7 An employee's
seniority may be used to distribute a variety of benefits within
the workplace," including the assignment of vacant positions 9
As certain positions may be favored, particularly those involving
more stable day-time hours and lighter duties, seniority systems
serve as a reliable means of allocating newly vacant positions.6
These agreements generally give a reassignment preference to
workers with the greatest seniority,6' but the person with the
most seniority is not guaranteed to be offered the vacant posi-
tion.62 A seniority system may be beneficial to employees in that
it prevents the employer from granting preferential treatment to
favored employees and provides a reliable structure within the
workplace for allocating favored positions and benefits.6' Courts
recognize the positive impact of seniority agreements and respect
them accordingly.64
Lane Corp. Compel the Consideration of External Law in Labor Arbitration?
An Analysis of the Influence of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Arbitral
Decisionmaking, 25 STETSON L. REV. 53 (1995) (finding that there is a move-
ment towards the consideration of external law by arbitrators in interpreta-
tion of collective bargaining agreements).
55. See BAsIc PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, supra note 54, at 74(stating that seniority provisions are found in 89% of collective bargaining
agreements).
56. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976)(describing the importance of seniority systems); George Cooper & Richard B.
Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1598, 1604-05 (1969).
57. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 56, at 1602.
58. See id. at 1601-02.
59. See How ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 50, at 811.
60. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 56, at 1604-05 (describing the reliabil-
ity of seniority systems).
6L See How ARBITRATION WORKS, supra note 50, at 806.
62. See id. at 854 (discussing the consideration of an employee's experi-
ence, in addition to their seniority, in determining who should be hired for a
position).
63. See Cooper & Sobol, supra note 56, at 1604-05.
64. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 766 (1976)(describing the statements of courts which have found seniority rights to be
1400 [Vol. 82:1391
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11. STATUTORY RIGHTS IN A UNIONIZED WORKPLACE:
JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS TO THE REASSIGNMENT
DILEMMA
A. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ADA
The issue of whether the ADA requires reassignment of a
disabled employee in violation of a seniority agreement has been
problematic.65 Courts have generally sought to resolve this con-
flict through an interpretation of the ADA's reasonable accom-
modation requirements.'
1. Eckles: The Majority Approach
In Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, the Seventh Circuit provided
the most thorough articulation of the majority view that the ADA
does not require reassignment in violation of collectively bargained
seniority rights.67 The plaintiff in Eckles worked as a yardmas-
ter in a rail yard in a position that required varying shifts in a
tower office accessible only by stairs.68 Months after he began
work, a doctor diagnosed Eckles with epilepsy and advised him to
transfer to a shift with regular work hours and to cease working
in the tower office.69 Although there were no vacant positions in
the workplace meeting these specifications, Eckles requested
that the employer "bump" another employee in order to accommo-
date him in a different position, a request that was consistent
with the collective bargaining agreement, which allowed the em-
ployer to bump a worker to accommodate a disabled employee0
important).
65. See infra Part IIA (describing the conflict between Eckles and Aka).
66. See infra notes 74-84, 89-97 and accompanying text (describing the
analysis in Eckles and Aka).
67. Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, 94 F.3d 1041 (7th Cir. 1996). The Eckles
decision has been quite influential in its holding. See infra note 73 (listing the
courts that relied on Eckles). Courts that have relied on the holding in Eckles
have often given little or no independent evaluation of the issue or the method
of reasoning in Eckles, but have simply cited its holding. One court that did
discuss the Eckles holding and agreed with it was Kralik v. Durbin, 130 F.3d
76 (3d Cir. 1997). However, this court conducted no further inquiry and sim-
ply concurred with Eckles. See id. at 81-82.
68. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1043.
69. See id. The doctor was concerned that Eckles ran a risk of falling
from the stairs if he continued to work in the tower office. See id.
70. See id. at 1044. In this workplace, positions were rarely vacant be-
cause the collective bargaining agreement allowed more senior employees to
"bump" less senior employees from their positions. See id. at 1047. The col-
lective bargaining agreement contained a provision that allowed the employer
14011998]
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Although initially granting Eckles's request, the employer
and union later reneged and refused to provide Eckles with a
satisfactory position.7' Eckles filed suit alleging that the em-
ployer and union discriminated under the ADA by not allowing
him a position that satisfied his doctor's specifications and by
not guaranteeing him security from being bumped from his cur-
rent position." The court held that the ADA did not require the
employer to violate the bona fide seniority rights of other workers
under the collective bargaining agreement and upheld the grant
of summary judgment for the employer.,
The Eckles court engaged in a statutory analysis of the ADA
to determine whether Eckles's requested accommodation was
required under the Act.74 In its analysis, the court considered
to "bump" a worker to accommodate a disabled worker. It was under this
provision that the union and employer initially agreed to reassign Eckles to a
new position that required displacing a more senior employee. See id.
71. See i When the union and employer rescinded the initial accommoda-
tion, they allowed Eckles to be bumped from his new position. At the time he filed
suit, Eckles worked in a position that he obtained with his seniority; however, he
was not secure from being bumped again by a more senior employee. See id&
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1051-52. The court stated, "After examining the text, back-
ground, and legislative history of the ADA duty of 'reasonable accommoda-
tion,' we conclude that the ADA does not require disabled individuals to be
accommodated by sacrificing the collectively bargained, bona fide seniority
rights of other employees." Id. at 1051.
Other courts have concurred with the holding in Eckles. See Kralik v.
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1997) (discussing the Eckles coures analysis and
agreeing with it); Foreman v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 117 F.3d 800 (5th Cir.
1997) (holding that seniority rights trump the ADA provision to reassign a
disabled worker to a vacant position); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, 62 F.3d
1108 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the ADA does not require an employer to
violate the seniority rights of other workers); Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58
F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the ADA did not require a violation
of collectively bargained seniority rights in order to accommodate a disabled
worker); Milton v. Scrivner, 53 F.3d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a employee was not entitled to reassignment under the ADA in violation of
the seniority rights of other workers).
74. In addition to the statutory analysis, the court considered the rele-
vance of a provision in the collective bargaining agreement. Rule 2-H-1 of the
collective bargaining agreements allowed for the transfer of a disabled worker
in certain situations. It stated:
Subject to agreement... between Manager-Labor Relations and Di-
vision Chairman, a disabled employee... may be placed in a new
position or vacancy, or position or vacancy that is under advertise-
ment but not yet filled, or in a position occupied by another employee,
without regard to seniority, provided such an employee is capable of
performing the duties required.
Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1044 n.2.
The court held that this provision imposed no obligation on the employer
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the plain language of the ADA, the EEOC regulations, case
precedent, and legislative history." The court articulated a strong
concern for the seniority rights of other workers and stated that
it viewed the conflict as one between the rights of the disabled
worker and his coworkers rather than a conflict between the
employer and the disabled employee. 6
An interpretation of the ADA's legislative history was central
to the.Eckles court's analysis. The court focused on one section
of the House Report that discusses potential conflicts between
the requirements of the ADA and terms of an applicable collec-
tive bargaining agreement." The Report contained a statement
that a collective bargaining agreement "may be considered as a
factor in determining whether [an accommodation] is a reason-
able accommodation... but the agreement would not be deter-
minative."78 The court found that the context of this statement
to reassign Eckles but "rather it simply allows for such a compromise at the
option of both parties." Id- at 1051.
75. The Eckles court found that the plain language of the Act was incon-
clusive and therefore looked to other factors. See id. at 1047.
76. See id at 1046. The court expressed its concern at several points in
the analysis. It stated, "This poses a conflict not so much between the rights
of the disabled individual and his employer and union, but between the rights
of the disabled individual and those of his co-workers." Id. Additionally, in a
footnote, the court stated that it did not intend for all provisions of collective
bargaining agreements to trump the ADA, but only in the case of seniority
rights "that establish rights in other employees." Id. at 1046 n.9. The court
also expressed concern that seniority rights of other employees would not be
considered relevant in an undue hardship analysis. See id. at 1050 n.15.
Subsequent courts citing Eckles have also indicated this concern by citing
the Eckles holding as protecting the rights of other workers. See Kralik, 130
F.3d at 82; Milton, 53 F.3d at 1125.
77. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1049-50.
78. See id. The relevant portion of the House Report states:
The section 504 regulations provide that "a recipient's obligations
to comply with this subpart [employment] is not affected by any in-
consistent term of any collective bargaining agreement to which it is
a party." 45 C.F.R. 84.11(c). The policy also applies to the ADA.
Thus, an employer cannot use a collective bargaining agreement to
accomplish what it otherwise would be prohibited from doing under
this Act. For example, a collective bargaining agreement that con-
tained physical criteria which caused a disparate impact on indi-
viduals with disabilities and were not job-related and consistent with
business necessity could be challenged under this Act.
The collective bargaining agreement could be relevant, however,
in determining whether a given accommodation is reasonable. For
example, if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for
employees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a
factor in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to
assign an employee with a disability without seniority to the job.
However, the agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
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limited its application to situations in which the collective bar-
gaining agreement contained criteria for an employment position
that unfairly impacted disabled persons but that were not neces-
sary qualifications to perform the job duties." Since the collec-
tive bargaining agreement in Eckles was a bona fide agreement,
the court explained, the "relevant but not determinative" provi-
sion of the House Report was inapplicable. 0
The Eckles court also relied on cases decided under the Re-
habilitation Act, which had uniformly held that reassignment
was not a reasonable accommodation if it violated seniority
rights.8 Unlike the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act contained no
In other situations, the relevant question would be whether the
collective bargaining agreement articulates legitimate business cri-
teria. For example, if the collective bargaining agreement lists job
duties, such a list may be taken into account in determining whether
a given task is an essential function of the job. Again, however, the
agreement would not be determinative on the issue.
Conflicts between provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
and an employer's duty to provide reasonable accommodation may be
avoided by ensuring that agreements negotiated after the effective
date of this title contain a provision permitting the employer to take
all actions necessary to comply with this legislation.
H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
345-46.
79. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050. Commentators have critiqued the Eckles
court's interpretation of legislative history. See William J. Mcdevitt, Seniority
Systems and the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Fate of 'Reasonable Ac-
commodation" after Eckles, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 359 (1997) (arguing that the
Eckles court did not give sufficient weight to the legislative history indicating
that the seniority system was to be a factor, not determinative, in the appli-
cation of the reassignment provision of the ADA).
The court explained that Congress was particularly concerned that pre-
set, pretexutal job criteria would be used by employers to discriminate against
disabled workers and had included this statement in the Report to address
this concern as applied to collective bargaining agreements. The court stated,
After clarifying that reassignment can only be to an unoccupied posi-
tion, the reports address another possible barrier to reassignment:
not being qualified for the position sought, either due to not meeting
the established physical criteria or the seniority minimum...
Because of the danger of manipulating such standards:. . to dis-
criminate against the disabled, the reports find that these standards
should be evaluated for their legitimacy, rather than merely accepted
as automatically preempting a particular reasonable accommodation.
Id. at 1050.
80. Id. at 1049-51.
81. See supra note 23 (discussing the Rehabilitation Act). A majority of
courts have held that the reassignment in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement is not required under the Rehabilitation Act. See Shea v. Tisch,
870 F.2d 786 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that reassignment in violation of a col-
lectively bargained seniority agreement is not required); Jasany v. United
States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that reassign-
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language suggesting that reassignment of a disabled worker was
a possible reasonable accommodation." Although the court ac-
knowledged the textual changes between the two acts, it found
that Rehabilitation Act cases were relevant in determining the
meaning of reasonable accommodation at the time Congress en-
acted the ADA. 3 The court explained that the ADA was, "to a
great extent," an extension of the Rehabilitation Act's provisions
to nonfederal employers, and that Rehabilitation Act case law on
reassignment was therefore persuasive."
2. Aka: The Minority Approach
The D.C. Circuits decision in Aka v. Washington Hospital5
challenged the majority view that reassignment in violation of a
seniority system was unreasonable as a matter of law. Although
it was presented with facts similar to those in Eckles,86 the D.C.
ment in violation of a collective bargaining agreement is not required).
82. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994).
83. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1049.
84. The court stated:
We also recognize that "to a great extent the employment provisions
of the [ADA] merely generalize to the economy as a whole the duties,
including that of reasonable accommodation, that the regulations un-
der the Rehabilitation Act imposed on federal agencies and federal
contractors." It is therefore appropriate that we look to decisions in-
terpreting the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act for guidance in
understanding the meaning of analogous requirements under the
ADA.
Id at 1047 (quoting Vande Zande v. Department of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542
(7th Cir. 1995)).
85. 116 F.3d 876 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This decision has been vacated and is
pending en banc review by the D.C. Circuit.
86. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (describing the facts in
Aka). iMke Eckles, the collective bargaining agreement in Aka contained a
provision that allowed for transfer of disabled workers in certain cases. Para-
graph 14.5 of the collective bargaining agreement provided: "An employee who
becomes handicapped and thereby unable to perform his job shall be reassigned
to another job he is able to perform whenever, in the sole discretion of the Hospi-
tal, such reassignment is feasible and will not interfere with patient care or the
orderly operation of the Hospital." Aka, 116 F.3d at 892. The court determined
that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement may impose an obligation
on the employer to reassign Aka. The court stated that, when read as a whole,
the "provision authorizing the transfer of handicapped employees to vacant po-
sitions creates an exception to the otherwise-applicable [seniority procedure]."
IH Therefore, the court interpreted the provision as limiting the seniority rights
of the other employees by stipulating that in some cases these rights would be
abridged in order to reassign a disabled worker. See id. at 892-93.
At least one other court has held that a transfer provision for disabled
workers in a collective bargaining agreement may limit the seniority rights of
other workers. See Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1993)
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Circuit overturned the lower court's grant of summary judgment
to Washington Hospital 7 and directed the district court on re-
mand to evaluate the conflict between the collective bargaining
agreement and the ADA in the same manner that governs other
forms of reasonable accommodation-the undue hardship test.8
Although it reached the opposite conclusion, the Aka court
considered many of the same factors as the Eckles court. The
court first determined that the plain language of the Act ap-
peared to require a reassignment in all cases subject only to
specific exceptions.89 However, the court also looked to the legis-
lative history and the Rehabilitation Act cases to augment its
analysis. First, the court considered the same passage from the
House Report as Eckles ° However, the Aka court did not conclude
that the context of the statement limited its application. Rather,
the court interpreted the Report as indicating Congress's intent to
prohibit a per se rule based on a term of any collective bargaining
agreement.9' The court concluded that the legislative history
supported the application of a fact-specific reasonable accommo-
dation analysis and that the seniority provision of the collective
bargaining agreement should be a factor in that analysis.
The Aka court also considered reassignment cases decided
under the Rehabilitation Act, but it determined that these cases
were not relevant to its analysis. The court found that the addi-
tional language in the ADA explicitly addressing reassignment
rendered the Rehabilitation Act cases unpersuasive in interpret-
ing the reassignment provision of the ADA.93 Therefore, the court
(upholding a transfer of a disabled employee in a unionized workplace with a
seniority system because the court determined that the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement had modified the rights of the other workers).
87. The lower court had found for the employer as a matter of law. See
Aka, 116 F.3d at 897.
88. See id.
89. See supra notes Part IA.3 (noting the limitations of the reassignment
provision).
90. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 895-96; see also supra notes 77-80 and accompa-
nying text (describing the Eckles courfs consideration of the Report and
quoting the Report).
9L SeeAka, 116 F.3d at 895-96.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 893 ("[We note that although [the Rehabilitation] Act is
quite similar to the ADA in most respects, the two acts diverge sharply on this
particular question, because the ADA explicitly suggests 'reassignment to a
vacant position' as a form of 'reasonable accommodation' that may be required
of its employers." (citations omitted)).
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disregarded the Rehabilitation Act cases and examined only the
ADA in its interpretation?4
Finally, the Aka court did not emphasize the rights of the
other workers like the Eckles court did. 5 The court viewed the
issue of a conflict between seniority rights and the ADA as in-
distinguishable from any other conflict between a term of a col-
lective bargaining agreement and ADA requirements. 6 Thus,
the court concluded any limits on an employer's duty to reassign
derived not from any special status granted to a unionized set-
ting but from the same provisions of the statute and regulations
that govern reassignment generally.97
B. THE STATUS OF SENIORITY RIGHTS UNDER TITLE VII
Although the Supreme Court has not decided a case under
the ADA to date, the Court has considered the nature of senior-
ity rights in terms of the requirements of Title VII.9 In Franks
v. Bowman Transportation Co.,99 the Supreme Court determined
that a remedy for race discrimination under Title VIH should be
94. See id. The Aka court's conclusion that the Rehabilitation Act cases
are not relevant is supported by a majority of courts considering the reas-
signment issue in a non-unionized workplace. See Gile v. United Airlines,
Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a majority of courts
have determined that the Rehabilitation Act cases are not relevant to inter-
preting the reassignment provision of the ADA).
95. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 896. In support of its position that a court
should engage in an undue hardship test to determine whether reassignment
is required under the ADA, the court pointed out that in some cases the bur-
den on employees displaced by the reassignment would be minimal:
If one nondisabled employee entitled to a vacant position under the
seniority system in the collective bargaining agreement must wait an
extra day before receiving an identical assignment because the ear-
lier vacancy was filled by a disabled employee pursuant to the ADA,
would this entail the "sacrifice" of "rights" created in other employees
under the agreement?
Id.
The court also stated that the employee's seniority rights "were already
limited by the handicapped-transfer provision, which prevented them from
bidding for (and asserting their seniority preference in regard to) vacancies
required to be given to reassigned handicapped employees under [the collec-
tive bargaining agreement]." Id. at 897.
96. See id. at 896.
97. See id.
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
99. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). Some commentators have found Franks relevant
to this issue. See Renee L. Cyr, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Implications for Job Reassignment and the Treatment of Hypersusceptible
Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1237, 1257-58 (1992).
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granted despite its infringement upon the collectively bargained
seniority rights of other workers.' In this holding, the Court
discussed the nature of seniority rights in the context of a civil
rights statute. The Court acknowledged that the interests of
other employees would be to some degree harmed by granting
the plaintiffs retroactive seniority.10 1 But since neither the lan-
guage of the Act nor the legislative history of Title VII prohibited
this remedy, the Court held that the Act required it despite the
negative impact on the rights of the other workers.02 The Court
stated that seniority rights under the collective bargaining
agreement were not "indefeasibly vested rights conferred by the
employment contract.""3 "This Court," it explained, "has long
held that employee expectations arising from a seniority system
agreement may be modified by statutes furthering a strong pub-
lic policy interest."'04 Given the strong public policy interest in
enforcing a remedy for Title VII discrimination, the court held
that infringement of seniority rights was required."5
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,"6 the Supreme
Court addressed a conflict between Title Virs requirement that
100. See Franks, 424 U.S. at 764-66. In Franks, a lower court had held
that the employer had discriminated by refusing to hire black workers be-
cause of their race. The plaintiffs had requested that, in addition to an order
requiring the employer to hire members of the class of workers discriminated
against, the court order the employer to grant retroactive seniority status to
these workers. See id. at 757. However, the lower court refused to grant the
retroactive seniority status as a part of the court ordered remedy on the
grounds that it would violate the collectively bargained seniority rights of
other workers. See id.
101. See id. at 774-75. The Court stated:
[We find untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be
denied merely because the interests of other employees may thereby
be affected. "If relief under Title VII can be denied merely because
the majority group of employees, who have not suffered discrimina-
tion, will be unhappy about it, there will be little hope of correcting
the wrongs to which the Act itself is directed."
Id. at 775 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663
(2d Cir. 1971)).
102. See id. at 774-75. The Court stated: "[A] collective-bargaining
agreement may go further, enhancing the seniority status of certain employ-
ees for-purposes of furthering public policy interests beyond what is required
by statute, even though this will to some extent be detrimental to the expec-
tations acquired by other employees under the previous seniority agreement."
Id. at 778-79.
103. See id. at 778.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 779.
106. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). The Eck-
les court relied on this case in its analysis. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, 94
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employer's accommodate the religious practices of their employees
and collectively bargained seniority rights. The case involved an
employee who requested that he be permitted to abstain from
working on Saturdays in accordance with his religious beliefs.107
Allowing this accommodation would have required that the air-
line violate its system for allowing days off under the collective
bargaining agreement, in effect granting the plaintiff a benefit
reserved for employees with more seniority.18
In its decision, the Court first established that Title VII did
not require employers to implement any accommodation that
imposed more than a de minimus hardship on the employer. 0 9
Applying this standard, the Court held that if a seniority system
was nondiscriminatory, then it should not be violated in order to
accommodate a worker's religious beliefs because this accommo-
dation would impose more than a de minimus hardship. 0 The
Court also emphasized that the requested accommodation would
violate Title VI's requirement of equal treatment by favoring
one employee because of his religion while penalizing other
workers based on their religions."' Finally, the Court concluded
F.3d 1041, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996). The court stated that the issue in Hardison
was not equivalent to the reassignment issue under the ADA, but that it was
instructive. See id. at 1049. The Eckles court acknowledged that the legisla-
tive history of the ADA contained a statement that the ADA's reasonable ac-
commodation standard be held to a higher standard than the de minimnus test
the Court applied in Hardison. But the court concluded that Congress did not
reject the Court's overall holding indicating the importance of seniority rights
when threatened by a requested accommodation. The court stated, "[Mt is
clear from the context of this statement... that Congress intended to reject
the de minimus rule of Hardison, rather than the overall holding of the case
or the refusal to require an employer to violate the seniority rights of other
employees to accommodate the religious restrictions of the plaintiff." Id. at
1049 n.12.
107. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67-68.
108. See id. at 68-69.
109. See id. at 75-76, 84 (describing the determination that more than a de
minimus cost imposes an undue hardship on the employer).
110. See id. at 84. The Court distinguished its holding from the holding in
Franks. The Court stated that in Franks the violation of the seniority agree-
ment was allowed as a remedy for past discrimination. Thus, even though the
seniority system itself was not discriminatory, the employer had engaged in
past discrimination. However, the Hardison Court stated that its opinion was
consistent with Franks and cited Franks for the proposition that compelling
public policy considerations would warrant the violation of collectively bar-
gained seniority rights. See id. at 79 n.12.
111. See id. at 81. The Court stated, "Title VII does not contemplate such
unequal treatment. The repeated, unequivocal emphasis of both the language
and the legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in em-
ployment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is directed against
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that Title VII actually prohibited an accommodation in violation
of the seniority system because the statute contained a provision
that a bona fide seniority system should not be construed as in
violation of it, as long as there was no intent to discriminate."'
II. ENFORCING THE ADA IN THE UNIONIZED
WORKPLACE: RESOLVING A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS
The conflict between the ADA and collectively bargained
seniority rights should not be resolved by granting summary
judgment on the basis that the ADA reassignment provision
does not require a violation of seniority rights as a matter of law.
Although the majority approach has appeal because it provides a
definite standard for employers, unions, and employees, it nei-
ther follows the language of the Act nor satisfies the intent of
Congress. A correct interpretation of the ADA, compelling public
policy, and important Supreme Court decisions about the nature
of seniority rights vis-h-vis statutorily created civil rights instead
support the application of the fact-specific undue hardship
analysis. This approach also has the benefit of treating disabled
workers according to the same standard whether or not they
work in a unionized workplace.
A. CRrIQUE OF THE PER SE RULE
The Eckles court's interpretation that the ADA's reassign-
ment provision should never force employers to violate collec-
tively bargained seniority rights is not supported by the Act, the
legislative history, or the EEOC regulations, and the Rehabili-
tation Act cases and Supreme Court decision upon which Eckles
relied were not relevant to the issue.
majorities as well as minorities." Id.
112. See id. at 81-82. The Court cited Section 703(h) of Title VII, which
provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply differ-
ent standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit
system... provided that such differences are not the result of an in-
tention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.
Id. at 81-82 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1994)).
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1. Shaky Foundations: The Eckles Holding Misconstrued the
Issues Presented
The majority approach rests on a flawed analytical premise
because the Eckles court misconstrued the issue at hand. First,
the court viewed the issue as a conflict between the rights of the
disabled worker and the rights of the remaining workers rather
than as a conflict between the employer and the disabled em-
ployee."' By framing the issue in this way, the court's analysis
emphasized the seniority rights of other workers, and this focus
may have skewed its overall analysis. In contrast, the court did
not mention that the fate of the disabled worker who was re-
fused reassignment was potential unemployment."4
The court also overstepped the issue presented in the case
which negatively influenced the holding. The court broadly held
that reassignment to a vacant position was not required under
the ADA if it conflicted with bona fide seniority rights under a
collective bargaining agreement, even though this was not the
issue before the court."5 The plaintiff in Eckles was an employee
who argued that he should be reassigned to a non-vacant posi-
tion, by displacing another employee, and that he should be pro-
tected in his position from being bumped by more senior employ-
ees."6 Therefore, the first issue raised in Eckles was whether the
ADA requires an employer to "bump" an employee to reassign a
disabled worker. The second issue was whether a disabled em-
ployee can be protected in his position from being displaced by a
more senior employee.
As the Eckles court acknowledged, this issue could have
been easily resolved by consulting the plain language of the
ADA, the EEOC regulations, and legislative history on point." 7
The history states that employers are not required to bump em-
ployees in order to accommodate a disabled worker"' and the Act
113. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1046 (7th Cir.
1996).
114. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text (describing the Eckles
courtes analysis).
115. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051.
116. See id. at 1047.
117. See id. at 1050 ("Both the Senate and House Reports explicitly state
that 'bumping' is not required, which would seem to clear up any remaining
doubt about whether the ADA required bumping in this particular case.").
118. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (quoting the House Re-
port and discussing the Eckles courts interpretation of the Report). This
statement may be determinative to the first issue raised in Eckles, whether
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only requires "reassignment to a vacant position." '19 Therefore,
the issue presented in Eckles involved an accommodation that
was clearly beyond the scope of the Act. Despite this simple so-
lution, the Eckles court continued to examine whether seniority
rights should be abridged to accommodate a disabled worker'20
and held that seniority rights should not be abridged under the
reassignment provision of the ADA.'21
The consequences of the Eckles courts mischaracterization
of the issue are magnified by its persuasiveness to other courts,
who cite it as an authority for the proposition that the ADA does
not require a violation of collectively bargained seniority
rights." These courts often fail to analyze the issue, instead
relying on the holding in Eckles as sound." In this way, the
Eckles decision has had far-reaching impact. This is problematic
in that the Eckles court was not faced with a fact scenario that
clearly presented the countervailing concern for a disabled em-
ployee requesting a reassignment within the scope of the ADA.
2. The Legislative History Is Inconsistent with
the Majority Approach
The legislative history of the ADA nowhere indicates that
seniority rights should trump a reassignment request under the
ADA. In fact, the legislative history contains statements that the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement should not be determi-
native in assessing a reasonable accommodation.'24 The Eckles
court concluded that these statements were not applicable by inter-
the employer should bump another employee to accommodate Eckles. The
second issue, whether Eckles could be protected from being bumped by an-
other employee raises a different issue and was not addressed by the court.
This issue is also not resolved by determining that an employer must reassign
a disabled worker regardless of a seniority agreement.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994) (emphasis added).
120. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
121. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1051. The Eckles court attempted to link the
bumping statement to the issue of reassignment generally by concluding that it
indicated Congress's concern for the rights of other employees. This may in fact
have been Congress's concern in setting this limit on reassignment. However,
extrapolating this concern to include a prohibition on violating the seniority
rights of other workers takes this statement beyond the bounds of reasonable
interpretation.
122. See supra note 73 (listing the courts that have followed Eckles).
123. See supra note 67.
124. See supra note 78 (citing the text of the House Report statement).
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preting them as limited by context, but the court did not provide any
additional legislative history to directly support its holding.'
A close examination of the House Report does not support
the Eckles court's interpretation."6 Rather, the context of the
statement provides compelling support for the Aka court's inter-
pretation that a fact-specific analysis should be applied.' Spe-
cifically, the statement is contained within a paragraph of the
Report that begins by stating that the obligation to comply with
the ADA is "not affected by any inconsistent term of any collective
bargaining agreement."12u This language indicates that a term of
a collective bargaining agreement should not affect at all an
employer's obligation under the ADA. When the Report subse-
quently states that the collective bargaining agreement could be a
factor in determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, it
appears to be amending this initial language by allowing a collec-
tive bargaining agreement to be relevant in determining whether
an accommodation is reasonable.129 The Report even provides an
example of a hypothetical case involving seniority rights, stating,
if a collective bargaining agreement reserves certain jobs for employ-
ees with a given amount of seniority, it may be considered as a factor
in determining whether it is a reasonable accommodation to assign
an employee with a disability without seniority to the job. However,
the agreement would not be determinative on the issue."'
In this example, allowing a person without requisite seniority a
job, while another worker with seniority is denied the position,
violates the seniority rights of that worker. Therefore, the Report
is clear that the terms of collective bargaining agreements, even
those that specify seniority, are to be relevant but not dispositive
on the issue of a reasonable accommodation.
The majority view that the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement are only relevant in a reasonable accommodation
analysis when the agreement includes pretextual criteria also con-
flicts with the scope of the ADA.' Title I of the ADA is designed
125. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1050.
126. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
127. See Aka v. Washington Hospital, 116 F.3d 876,895-96 (D.C. Cir. 1997).




131. The Eckles court seems to draw the conclusion that only pretextual
criteria should be considered relevant in a reasonable accommodation analysis
from another example listed in the paragraph. The Report lists an example in
which it states that if a collective bargaining agreement reserved certain po-
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to remove barriers to employment for disabled persons regard-
less of whether the barriers result from intentional discrimina-
tion or from structures, policies, or procedures that have an un-
intended impact on disabled persons.12 Employers must make
reasonable accommodations for a disabled employee without a
showing that the employer is intentionally discriminating or has
imposed unnecessary criteria for a position.'33 These modifica-
tions to otherwise legitimate workplace duties and procedures
are required under the Act.34 In light of the scope of the reason-
able accommodation standard, it is not consistent to interpret
the reassignment provision as limited in a unionized workplace
to cases in which artificial barriers stand between the disabled
person and the position. This interpretation alters the purpose
of the ADA in a unionized workplace: while other employer must
comply regardless of their intent, unionized employers are immune
unless intent or unnecessary criteria are shown. Certainly there is
no indication in the ADA that suggests that the duty to provide
reasonable accommodation, including reassignment, applies only
in a non-unionized workplace. Without such explicit indication,
the majority conclusion appears in conflict with the require-
ments of the Act.
3. The Rehabilitation Act Cases Are Not Relevant to the
Interpretation of the Reassignment Provision of the ADA
The Eckles court relied on the Rehabilitation Act as direct
support for its holding that a disabled worker should not be re-
assigned in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.'35
sitions for employees with more seniority, this factor may be relevant in de-
termining whether assigning a disabled worker to one of these reserved posi-
tions would be a reasonable accommodation. See id. The example does not
mention the requirement that the seniority agreement be pretextual in order
for it to be infringed upon by the ADA's requirements. Additionally, the Re-
port concludes this section with the suggestion that collective bargaining
agreements contain a section which allow for all action necessary to comply
with the Act. See id. This also suggests that Congress intended for collective
bargaining agreements not to be determinative.
132. See supra notes 21-38 and accompanying text (describing the pur-
poses of the ADA and the reasonable accommodation requirement). The
definition of reasonable accommodation requires employers to take affirma-
tive action even in situations where there was no intent to exclude a disabled
person. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). Therefore, a perfectly legitimate job
requirement could be amended in order to comply with the Act. See id.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
134. See id.
135. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047-49 (7th Cir.
1996).
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This was the only source of direct support for the court's holding.'36
The Rehabilitation Act cases clearly do support the Eckles holding
in a Rehabilitation Act context;'37 however, the issue is whether
these cases are persuasive in interpreting the reassignment
provision of the ADA in light of the significant textual changes
between the two acts.'
As the Aka court observed, the Rehabilitation Act, unlike
the ADA, contained no language instructing employers that re-
assignment is a possible reasonable accommodation.' This
clear indication by Congress that reassignment should be con-
sidered as a reasonable accommodation has lead the majority of
courts to find that the Rehabilitation Act cases are not relevant
in evaluating a reassignment request in a non-unionized work-
place under the ADA.' The Seventh Circuit's reliance on the
general applicability of Rehabilitation Act precedent to interpret-
ing the ADA fails to recognize that the reassignment issue is one
where substantive differences between the two statutes severely
limit the relevance, if any, of the Rehabilitation Act case law to
construing the ADA.'4' The court's attempt to explain away this
critical difference is both unpersuasive and unsupported.
4. Supreme Court Precedent Supports Abridgment of Seniority
Rights to Further Significant Public Policy Interests
As the Eckles court observed, reassignment under the ADA
unquestionably reduces the value of the seniority rights of other
workers. When a disabled worker is reassigned without re-
gard to seniority, an employee who has the seniority status to
136. None of the other sources upon which Eckles relied provided support
for reassignment in conflict with collective bargaining to allow a reasonable
accommodation for a disabled worker.
137. See supra note 81.
138. BothAka andEckles identified this issue.
139. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994); see also supra notes 93-94 and ac-
companying text (describing the Aka court's conclusion that the Rehabilitation
Act cases were not relevant to interpretation of the reassignment provision).
140. See supra note 94.
141. Although the Eckles court acknowledged this textual difference be-
tween the two acts, it still found the Rehabilitation Act cases relevant to its
holding. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1048-49 (7th
Cir. 1996).
142. See Eckles, 94 F.3d at 1045-46. None of the employees claimed that
their reassignment would not impact the seniority rights of other workers.
The Aka court did discuss the possibility that a reassignment of a disabled
worker may have a relatively small impact on the seniority rights of other
workers. See Aka v. Washington Hosp., 116 F.3d 876,896 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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qualify for the position is unable to reap the reward promised
under the system.43 Because seniority rights are an important
part of collective bargaining agreements governed by the NLRA,
the abridgment of a workers seniority rights is a concern.'" Al-
though the court identified this concern, it did not explore the
nature of the seniority rights as compared with rights created by
the ADA. The closest the Eckles court came to evaluating these
competing rights was in its consideration of the Supreme Court's
decision in Hardison. Although the Court in Hardison considers
seniority rights under Title VII, consideration of the case reveals
that it does not lend support to the holding in Eckles. Further-
more, the Court's opinion in Franks v. Bowman Transport supports
a finding that seniority rights may be abridged when important
public policy concerns are at stake.
As the Eckles court noted, the Supreme Court in Hardison
held that the requirement under Title VII to make a reasonable
accommodation for an employee's religious beliefs did not re-
quire a violation of other employee's seniority rights.'45 The
court failed to acknowledge, however, that Hardison is distin-
guishable from the issue in Eckles on several significant
grounds. First, although both the ADA and Title VII require an
employer to make reasonable accommodations, the standards
applied for each act are different. In Hardison, the Court estab-
lished that employers should bear no more than a de minimus
hardship in accommodating an employee's religious beliefs.'" In
contrast, the extensive discussion of reasonable accommodation
and the undue hardship standard in the ADA strongly indicates
that more than a de minimus hardship is required.'47 This posi-
tion is further supported by the legislative history, which explic-
itly states that the reasonable accommodation standard under
the ADA is to require more than the de minimus test defined in
Hardison.' Given the different standards of reasonable accom-
modation under Title VII and the ADA, Hardison cannot per-
143. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part I.B.
145. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81-82 (1977).
146. See id. at 84.
147. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
148. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(HI), at 68 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C-A.N. 267, 350 ("By contrast, under the ADA, reasonable accommoda-
tions must be provided unless they rise to the level of 'requiring significant
difficulty or expense' on the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted
in the statute-i.e., a significantly higher standard than that articulated in
Hardison.").
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suasively resolve the issue of whether seniority rights may be
violated under the ADA's reasonable accommodation standard.,
The imposition of a higher reasonable accommodation standard
means that employers will have to take more actions to accom-
modate disabled workers under the ADA than are required un-
der Title VII.
A second distinction between Hardison and the ADA's re-
assignment issue is also due to the difference between the ADA
and Title VII. The focus of Title VII is not to discriminate,
meaning not to treat workers differently based on religion or
other protected classes.Y0 Title VIrs reasonable accommodation
requirement, which applies only to religion, is described in one
section with no specifics or examples.' In contrast, the require-
ment of reasonable accommodation is central to the ADA's con-
ception of nondiscrimination. Unlike Title VI, the ADA con-
tains extensive discussion of the reasonable accommodation
requirement.'52 In Hardison, the Court expressed concern that
allowing the employee an exception to the seniority system in
order to accommodate his religious beliefs would be granting him
preferential treatment because of his religion, while at the same
time penalizing other workers based on their religious beliefs.'53
The Court determined that this unequal treatment was contrary
to the overriding concern of Title VII not to discriminate based
on religion and that, to comply with the overall spirit of Title
VII, the accommodation should be refused."4 In contrast, the
ADA clearly requires employer actions that will inevitably result in
preferential treatment for disabled workers. 5 Disabled workers
may be allowed special equipment, more breaks, adjusted
working hours, or adjustments in procedure under the Act.1 56
These all result in different treatment for disabled persons be-
cause of their disabilities-this is the nature of the ADA. Therefore,
the Court's concern in Hardison that granting an accommodation
would violate the more compelling statutory focus-not to treat
employees differently-is not a consideration under the ADA.
149. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994), with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (defining unlawful practices under the Act).
151. See id. § 2000e(j).
152. See id. § 12111(9).
153. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-81 (1977).
154. See id.
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (describing the accommodations employers




Another distinction between the ADA and Title VII that
limits the relevance of Hardison is that Title VII contains ex-
plicit instructions regarding its function when a collective bar-
gaining agreement is in effect. Title VII states that "a bona fide
seniority or merit system" should not be interpreted as unlawful
as long as there was no intent to discriminate found. 57 The
Hardison Court relied on this statement to support its interpre-
tation that the statute did not require a violation of bona fide
collectively bargained seniority rights.'58 In contrast, the ADA
does not contain an equivalent provision, and, in fact, the legis-
lative history of the Act indicates that Congress anticipated that
collective bargaining agreements should comply with the ADA
and would only be considered as a factor in a determination of
the ADA's requirements. 9 Furthermore, the fact that the ADA
does not include a provision similar to the one in Title VII sup-
ports interpreting the ADA as not allowing a collective bargain-
ing term to trump an ADA provision. As Congress included this
provision in Title VII, it may be concluded that if it wanted to
similarly limit the application of the ADA, another civil rights
statute, then it would have included a like provision.
The Eckles court also failed to recognize the relevance of the
Supreme Court's decision in Franks to the issue presented.6 In
Franks, the Supreme Court held that a remedy for discrimina-
tion under Title VII should be granted regardless of the negative
impact on the seniority rights of other workers. 6' The signifi-
cance of Franks lies mainly in the Court's discussion of the na-
ture of collectively bargained seniority rights.62 The Court
stated that seniority rights were not "indefeasibly vested rights"
impervious to alteration but that seniority rights may be
abridged to satisfy important public policy considerations.'63 The
Court found that the rights granted employees under Title VII
157. See id. § 2000e-2(h) (1994).
158. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81-82.
159. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
160. See Cyr, supra note 99, at 1257-58 (considering Franks relevant to the
issue of a conflict between the reassignment provision of the ADA and collec-
tively bargained seniority rights).
16L See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976).
162. Due to differences in the factual scenario, the holding of Franks is not
as persuasive to the issue in Eckles as is the Court's discussion of the nature
of seniority rights.
163. See Franks, 42 U.S. at 778.
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could provide a basis for altering seniority rights where the
rights were in conflict."6
Rights afforded workers under the ADA are analogous to
those provided under Title VII. Furthermore, overriding public
policy concerns led Congress to enact the ADA, 65 not as a statute
which requires employers to treat disabled workers equally with
other workers, but as a statute which requires affirmative acts
by the employer.'6 This affirmative requirement reflects Con-
gress's strong interest in allowing the disabled to have equal op-
portunities in the workplace and the compelling public policy
reasons to comply with the Act. Therefore, the holding in
Franks indicates that reassignment should not be rejected as an
accommodation based on the effect it has on other workers' sen-
iority rights. 67 Instead, the issue should be whether there are
compelling policy considerations to support the ADA's applica-
tion. There appears to be ample support for concluding that
compliance with the ADA presents a strong enough public policy
interest to satisfy the Supreme Court's standard. However,
since the seniority rights are important, the ADA does not disre-
gard them. The legislative history indicates that they are to be a
factor in a reasonable accommodation analysis' 6 and the statute
and regulations provide ample guidance for balancing employer
and employee concerns.
1 69
C. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT THE APPLICATION
OF A FACT-SPECIFIC TEST
The difficulties with the Eckles court's per se rule support
the application of the fact specific test described in Aka. In ad-
dition, public policy considerations support the minority ap-
proach and further undercut the reasoning utilized in Eckles.
1. The Reassignment Provision Protects All Workers
In the initial analysis, the ADA's reassignment provision
appears to benefit only the disabled worker to the exclusion of
164. See id. at 778-79.
165. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
167. This does not mean that the seniority rights hold no meaning. The
Court in Franks is clear that seniority rights are important and that it is be-
cause of the important policy interests served that abridgment is necessary.
See Franks, 424 U.S. at 766, 778-79.
168. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
14191998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the remaining employees in the workplace. The Eckles court in-
terpreted the ADA as conferring a benefit to only the disabled
worker and saw that benefit in conflict with the rights of the
other employees in the workplace.17 The court expressed concern
that without judicial intervention, the rights of these employees
would never be considered in a determination of an reasonable
accommodation.'71 However, a closer examination of the reas-
signment provision reveals that the Eckles court was short-
sighted in its concern and failed to recognize the benefit that the
ADA confers on all workers.7 '
The ADA exists to protect all disabled workers. But, since
classification as a disabled employee is not an immutable char-
acteristic, any worker may become a disabled worker and
thereby qualify for ADA protection. Both Eckles and Aka were
fully able employees until they developed medical problems
which resulted in a limitation of their physical abilities. 73 Prior
to their disability, it is likely that neither worker suspected they
would require the protection of the ADA. In this way, one func-
tion of the ADA is to act as a form of insurance for all workers by
kicking in to protect a worker who wants to remain employed
despite a newly developed disability.
The ADA's reassignment provision is particularly well char-
acterized as employee insurance due to its scope.'74 An employee
is eligible for reassignment only when she becomes disabled and,
as a result, must to transfer to a different position to be suffi-
ciently accommodated.' 75 This remedy is not available for new
applicants.'76 As Congress stated, reassignment for a disabled
worker provides an opportunity for a "valuable worker," no
longer able to perform in their prior position, to be transferred
170. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
17L See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the Eckles court's
concern that employees were not a factor in the undue hardship exam). Though
the interests of other employees are not explicitly mentioned in the undue hard-
ship analysis, the language is broad enough to include their consideration in the
terms of what is best for the employer. See Key, supra note 37 (arguing that the
effect on other employees should be a factor in an undue hardship analysis).
172. The Aka court did not acknowledge the potential benefit to all work-
ers either.
173. See supra notes 1-6, 68-73 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
175. The reassignment of a disabled worker is not the first step in accommo-
dation. First the employer must attempt to accommodate the worker within the
current job classification. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 34.
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within the workplace rather than be discharged." Therefore,
the view that reassignment of a newly disabled worker is in
conflict with the interest of her coworkers does not consider the
potential benefit to any worker who develops a disability. The
fact that the ADA safety net is there for everyone mitigates any
immediate loss of seniority or other rights by workers.
2. A Per Se Rule Creates an Unjust Differential Between
Unionized and Non-Unionized Disabled Employees
An interpretation of the ADA in which reassignment is never
required in violation of a collectively bargained seniority agree-
ment allows unions and employers an exemption from this provi-
sion of the ADA. '78 While it may be possible for unions and em-
ployers to craft a transfer provision for disabled workers which
would be upheld, '79 it would be simple to craft a collective bargain-
ing agreement without considering the ADA, thereby leaving dis-
abled workers seeking reassignment with no legal remedy.' Un-
der the majority view, as long as the collective bargaining
agreement is bona fide, the seniority rights will prevail over the
reassignment provision regardless of the strength of the disabled
employees claim or the degree of inconvenience caused to the em-
ployer and the other employees. 8' Granting employers and un-
ions the ability to avoid liability under the reassignment provision
of the ADA is undesirable in part because it penalizes disabled
workers who belong to a union.'8 2 It is also undesirable simply be-
cause it treats similarly situated employers differently depending
on their union status. This type of disparate treatment should not
be permitted unless there is clear intent in the Act or legislative
177. See supra note 34.
178. The ADA applies to both unions and employers. See Supra note 26.
179. See supra note 86 (describing the holding in Buckingham, in which
the court found that a disabled transfer provision in a collective bargaining
agreement should be upheld).
180. This result would be directly contrary to Congress's advisement that
employers and unions include a provision that allows for all action necessary
in order to comply with the ADA. See supra note 78.
181 See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
182. It is not likely that this disadvantage would be noted by workers
when evaluating whether or not to elect a union representative. It seems un-
likely that in a union election the issue of protection under this provision
would become an issue. Also, it is probable that many employees would not
foresee themselves as becoming disabled and requiring ADA protection.
Therefore, even if the employees did know about the disadvantage, it seems
unlikely that many would be concerned.
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history that it was Congress's intent. In this case, there is no indi-
cation that this was an intended or desirable result.
3. Seniority Rights Will Not Be Unduly Burdened
In evaluating the conflict of rights created by this issue, it is
important to consider the effect enforcing the reassignment provi-
sion in a unionized workplace with a seniority system will have on
the seniority rights of the workers. While the ADA may serve as a
form of insurance as protection for the future, in the present sen-
iority rights are being abridged. However, the reassignment pro-
vision is limited on many fronts by the language of the ADA, the
legislative history, the EEOC guidelines, and court precedent.'
Additionally, the reasonable accommodation standard, which is
defined by the undue hardship test, involves a comprehensive fact-
specific analysis which is designed to determine whether a re-
quested accommodation would place too great a burden on the
employer for it to be a "reasonable" accommodation.' Although
the analysis does not explicitly include the interests of the remain-
ing employees, the broad language allowing for employer interests
may include the effect on employees.'85 The reassignment provi-
sion is also limited by the many other guidelines established by
the EEOC and the legislative history, and most significantly is
only to be applied in situations in which the employee cannot be
accommodated within the original position.'86
These limitations do not mean that reassignment will never
be found to be a reasonable accommodation. There should be
cases in which reassignment is required accommodation. But
the above limitations restrict this accommodation and insure
that it is reserved for disabled employees who legitimately re-
quire it and that it is not granted if it imposes too great a hard-
ship on the employer.
183. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). The issue of whether the effect on
employees should be a factor in the analysis is undecided. See Key, supra
note 37 (arguing that the effect of a reasonable accommodation on the dis-
abled employee's coworkers should, in certain circumstances, be a factor in
the undue hardship analysis).
186. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
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D. EMPLOYERS AND UNIONS SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE
CONTROLLING NATURE OF THE ADA IN THEIR AGREEMENTS
In order to fully comply with the ADA, unions and employ-
ers should include in the terms of their collective bargaining
agreements provisions which obligate both the employer and
union to afford employees their civil rights under the ADA.
However, the terms of these agreements must be explicit to have
effect. In both Aka and Eckles the collective bargaining agree-
ments contained a provision for the transfer of disabled workers
at the employer's discretion,' 7 but neither of these agreements
prevented the conflict over the requested transfer and the courts
disagreed on the whether the provisions had substantive mean-
ing. A clear statement in the collective bargaining agreement
that the parties are bound by the requirements of the ADA
would clarify the obligations.'88 This approach was suggested by
Congress.' 9 Additionally, in order for both parties and employees
to understand the impact the reassignment provision may have
on seniority systems, it may be useful to include a statement to
this effect. Specifically, the agreement could state that any sen-
iority system or other system for allocating vacant positions may be
abridged if a reassignment of a disabled worker is determined to
be a reasonable accommodation under an ADA analysis. In this
way, all parties to the bargaining will understand that seniority
rights may be abridged if the ADA conditions are met.'90 Clearly
stating that the agreement will comply with ADA requirements
has the additional advantage of making it clear that the re-
quirements of the ADA are relevant to a labor arbitrator's deci-
sion.' 9'
187. See supra notes 74, 86 and accompanying text.
188. Under the Eckles holding, neither the union nor the employer have
any motivation to include a transfer provision within a collective bargaining
agreement. In fact, they have the motivation to design a seniority system, al-
ready a common provision, and to ignore the reassignment provision of the
ADA altogether. This way their seniority system will allow for exemption
from this provision of the ADA.
189. See supra note 78.
190. It will also be important for courts to enforce any provision incorpo-
rated into a collective bargaining agreement. As the Eckles court demon-
strated, it is possible for courts to find such provisions virtually meaningless
for the employee. See Eckles v. Consolidated Rail, 94 F.3d 1041, 1051 (7th
Cir. 1996). Hopefully, a specific reference to the standards of the ADA will
prevent courts from interpreting these provisions as relying completely on the
discretion of the employer as to whether a reassignment is required.




Congress enacted Title I of the ADA to assist disabled work-
ers in obtaining and preserving employment opportunities. In
this statute, Congress recognized that for some disabled workers
employment required affirmative acts by employers to make the
workplace accessible, and it required employers to make reason-
able accommodations for disabled workers. Although the rea-
sonable accommodation requirement does impose some degree of
hardship on the employer and results in disparate treatment of
employees, Congress determined that fostering the employment
of people with disabilities was a compelling goal that warranted
these measures.
As a reasonable accommodation, reassignment to a vacant
position is required for workers who are no longer able to function
within their current positions, subject to certain limitations in-
cluding the undue hardship analysis. When a request for reas-
signment conflicts with a collectively bargained seniority system,
the analysis should be no different. The majority's conclusion
that a conflict with seniority rights warrants a per se denial of
the disabled worker's request is not supported by the language of
the Act, the legislative history, the EEOC regulations, or rele-
vant case law. Additionally, since the reassignment provision
serves as a safety net for all workers, there to protect anyone
who becomes disabled, the negative impact of a reassignment is
mitigated by the potential benefit to all workers. Therefore,
courts should allow the ADA to function in all situations as it
was designed by Congress, through the application of a fact-
specific reasonable accommodation analysis.
consider outside law in the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements
when deciding disputes between union and management).
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